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13 November 1951

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DAILY DIGEST

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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25X1	SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

Postponement of Moscow Economic Conference designed to attract
more Western support: The American Embassy in Moscow believes that
the sponsors of the International Economic Conference, now postponed
to April 1952, hope it will contribute to relaxing Western trade restrictions. According to the Embassy, the recurring postponements of
the meeting probably indicate Soviet appreciation that the conference
could not score more than propaganda gains unless it included more
representative elements than so far obtained. Evidently the USSR still
hopes to attract more non-Communist businessmen and specialists who are
anxious to restore economic ties with the Soviet Orbit.

<u>Comment</u>: Concern has been expressed that non-Communist attendance at the conference would in fact result in increased public pressures on Western governments to allow shipment of critical items.

3. YUGOSLAVIA. Increased Hungarian pressures protested: The Yugoslav Legation in Budapest has delivered to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry a strong protest condemning Hungarian border units for "numerous and serious armed attacks and provocations." The Yugoslavs state that these actions constitute "irrefutable proof that the Hungarian Government has no desire to change its aggressive policy towards Yugoslavia."

To support this protest, the Yugoslavs contend that during the period from August 20 to October 10 Hungarian border units carried out

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133 incidents, opening fire 81 times on Yugoslav border guards and installations. firing rockets 50 times, and violating Yugoslav air space twice.

Comment: On 15 September 1951, the Yugoslavs protested against 52 provocations committed by Hungarian frontier guards between 11 July and 19 August. Thus, it would appear that the Hungarians have stepped up their pressure on the Yugoslav border since late August.

During the first 25 days of September, however, the Yugoslavs charged all the Cominformist countries with only 113 provocations. Since Rumania, Albania, and Bulgaria were charged with numerous provocations during the past three months, the Hungarians were either particularly active in late August or early October or the Yugoslav claims are inaccurate.

In addition, this latest complaint appears to contradict a statement of Assistant Foreign Minister Makiedo, who on 23 October told US Ambassador Allen that "border incidents had practically ceased." He attributed this to the desire of the Soviet Union to appear in a "good light" before each new UN General Assembly.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

1. NEAR EAST. New statement issued on principles of Middle East Command:
The three Western powers and Turkey are releasing on 10 November an 11point statement indicating their intention to proceed with the establishment of a Middle East Command. The statement outlines the principles on
which the Command is predicated, inviting all interested states individually
to associate themselves with it. Members of the Command will be offered
equipment "to the extent possible." The sponsoring powers specifically
state that the Command will in no way affect existing agreements and that
organizational changes and adjustments in the Command may be made as
needed.

Comment: While the four sponsoring powers do not expect any substantial Arab support for the Middle East defense plan at this time, this general statement of principles should encourage those officials in the Arab world who have privately expressed concern over the inherent military weakness of the area.

Serious difficulties, nevertheless, face the eventual implementation of these principles. While many Arab leaders have sharply criticized Egypt's precipitous rejection of the Middle East Command proposals, these same officials do not have the courage to oppose Egypt in public on this issue, or to break the formal united Arab front.

issue, or to break the formal united Arab front.

3. INDOCHINA. Progress of the Vietnamese Army disappointing: The US Legation in Saigon is concerned over the lack of real progress in the creation of a Vietnamese army. The administration of mobilization has demonstrated grave defects in the Huu government and the population

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	is	unenthusiastic	about	fighting	under	the	leadership	of	Bao	Dai,	Huu	and
25X1	De	Lattre.										

Comment: As long as Premier Huu retains the Defense portfolio--he also heads four other ministries--efficient and vigorous development of a Viet-namese army will be precluded. His unfitness for the job is widely recognized.

Although the Vietnamese population is considerably more aware now than a year ago of the Communist threat to their country, the people are generally reluctant to fight for a government which is believed controlled by the French and in an army suspected of being an appendage of the French army.

INDOCHINA. De Lattre reported in ill health: An official of the US Legation in Saigon interviewed General de Lattre for over three hours last week and found him more tired, more discouraged and more obviously in ill health than had been heretofore apparent. De Lattre's vigor seems to be rapidly weakening, and a member of his personal staff said the General must undergo an operation in France soon which will prevent his presence in Indochina for a considerable period.

Comment: De Lattre himself complained recently of his ill health and of the severe mental strain borne by his wife. His Chief of Staff is reported to have stated several days ago that the General could not spend another summer in Indochina.

5. INDONESIA. Philippine suggestion of SEA defense pact greeted with reserve:

According to a semi-official news agency, Indonesian parliamentary circles have greeted with great reserve a recent speech of the Philippine President advocating a Southeast Asian defense pact. Both parliamentary and press opinion have indicated that adherence to such a pact would be contrary to Indonesia's "independent" foreign policy.

Comment: In connection with the Philippine suggestion, Information Minister Mononutu stated on 5 November that Indonesia is not planning to conclude any pact or alliances within the near future, but that cooperation with neighboring countries will be continued.

6. Government requests clarification of reports that Netherlands
expects to annex Western New Guinea: A semi-official news agency reports
that the Netherlands High Commissioner to Indonesia on 7 November discussed with Prime Minister Sukiman press reports that draft changes in the
Dutch constitution propose incorporation of Western New Guinea into the
Netherlands kingdom. Prime Minister Sukiman stated that if the press

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reports are true, the Dutch intention can only be termed "an unfriendly act." The High Commissioner stated that no official word had been received from The Hague but agreed to inform the Netherlands Government immediately of the necessity of official clarification of the issue.

Comment: The disposition of Western New Guinea was not settled in December 1949 when Indonesia achieved its independence, and since that time the area has been under interim Dutch administration. A special conference in December 1950 to settle the issue was unsuccessful, and to date no further negotiations have been held.

7. CHINA. Peiping desires assurances "from US" on Chinese in Southeast Asia:

A Swiss Foreign Office spokesman states that the Peiping Foreign Office, approached by Indian Ambassador Panikkar in regard to Peiping's treatment of foreign nationals, did not "turn down" the approach but stated that, before making a formal reply, he would like assurances "from the US" regarding treatment of "Communists" in Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia. The US Minister in Bern comments that this Chinese action was an "obvious subterfuge," as Thailand and the Philippines have independent governments and an approach regarding Malaysia should be made to the UK.

Comment: The Peiping spokesman is reliably reported to have told Panikkar that representations on behalf of foreign nationals in China were to be viewed against a background of widespread persecution of overseas Chinese (not specifically Communists) in Southeast Asia. Panikkar was later reported to have told the UK of a Peiping proposal to exchange "Europeans" detained in China for Chinese imprisoned in Malaya; a British spokesman subsequently denied this report. The Swiss account of Panikkar's interview would largely reconcile the two reports, as the Peiping spokesman's remarks could be interpreted as implying that some such solution was possible.

- 8. Kuo Mo-jo reports on "cultural and educational" affairs: Kuo Mo-jo, Chairman of the Peiping regime's Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, has claimed in a recent report that
 - (1) illiteracy among industrial workers can be wiped out in three years;
 - (2) 25 million peasants are enrolled in winter schools, with a goal of 100 million;
 - (3) about half of China's 75 million children of school age are now in school, with a goal of 80 percent in five years; and
 - (4) newspaper circulation has reached seven million daily, a total of 800 million copies of books and periodicals have been published, and cinema

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attendance has reached 110 million (the last two figures are for six months).

Kuo noted that China needs "large numbers of cadres" and to that end must open many new "short-term" schools and special courses. Kuo also conceded "a lag between the actual state of culture and education and their tasks."

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Comment: Education has been limited in China to about 10 to 20 percent of the population, has traditionally been compressed and sterilized by orthodoxy, and has been largely in preparation for government employment. The demands of orthodoxy, and government pre-emption of students, are features which will be retained, although the orthodoxy is new and the kinds of employment more varied. Inasmuch as the state controls what its citizens may read, the Chinese who acquires literacy under the Peiping regime is assisting in his own enslavement. As Kuo's report indicates, the regime at this time is chiefly interested in extending this form of control over industrial workers and children.

9. Chinese Communists reportedly acquire British-flag coaster: According to the Hong Kong press, the Butterfield and Swire vessel Tsinan

25X1 (2,994 GT) has been sold to another Hong Kong firm. The press account follows a Nationalist report on 22 September that Butterfield and Swire intended to sell the Tsinan and two other vessels to the Chinese Communists.

Comment: Butterfield and Swire would not be able to secure official approval for the sale of the Tsinan to Communist China. It is possible, however, that the sale of the vessel will, for practical purposes, effect its transfer to Communist interests. Such interests are suspected to be the real owners of several vessels registered under the names of Hong Kong firms.

Pakistani vessel allegedly chartered to carry Ceylonese rubber to China: The Ceylon press on 8 November reported that a vessel had been chartered to call at Colombo shortly to load 3,800 tons of rubber for Communist China. This vessel is possibly the Pakistani-flag Kaderbaksh, which recently carried a cargo of raw cotton from Karachi to South China. According to current Hong Kong rumors, the Kaderbaksh is en route to Colombo to pick up 25X1 a rubber cargo.

Comment: The difficulty in finding shipping space has hampered Chinese Communist efforts to buy Ceylon rubber. Since the UN embargo of May 1951, which Ceylon has ignored, Communist purchasing agents have found only one Polish vessel to deliver rubber to China.

Pakistan has previously refused to permit its vessels to carry rubber to China, and there is no indication that it is about to reverse its stand.

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11.	CHINA/KOREA. Peiping said to be "very anxious" to end Korean conflict: A	
	member of the Indian cultural delegation recently in Peiping has expressed	
	the view that the Chinese Communists are "very anxious" to end the fighting	
25X1	in Korea.	_
	the Chinese Communists are "worried" about their economic situation.	
25X1		

Comment: Communist China's various economic difficulties are not believed to be sufficiently serious to force the regime to abandon its Korean commitment. Although most observers in or passing through the Communist capital have agreed that the regime appears to desire an armistice in Korea, evidence acquired in Peiping to support that belief has not been convincing. Peiping's propaganda on Korea, after a month of emphasis on the possibility of successful negotiations for a cease-fire, has returned to a balance between conciliatory and belligerent statements.

12. KOREA. Communist ground forces expected to remain on defensive in Korea:

The Far East Command, in a detailed analysis of the enemy's military intentions, foresees that the Communists will continue to defend their present ground positions. It is probable, however, that local counter-attacks to restore positions lost to the UN and limited "spoiling" attacks to disrupt UN offensive preparations will continue.

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There continue to be, according to FECOM, no indications that the Communists will utilize in the immediate future the still considerable offensive potential they retain in western Korea.

Comment: There are indications that the over-all enemy ground offensive potential in Korea has somewhat deteriorated in the past several weeks due to logistic difficulties and to a shortage of immediately available reserves in forward areas.

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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)

1.	FRANCE. French Communists attack proposed newspaper controls: French Com-
	munists are stepping up their attacks on proposed legislation which would
	bar persons with parliamentary immunity from the management of newspapers.
	Essentially an anti-Communist measure, the pending law, passage of which is
25X1	considered certain, would force Communist deputies to relinquish their positions on newspaper staffs.

Comment: The government supports this Socialist-sponsored legislation in its campaign to reduce Communist freedom of action.

Police removal of Communist art makes French Government appear ridiculous: Police removal of seven Communist paintings from an art exhibit, at the order of the government, is an example of unprofitable anti-Communist witch hunting. The government is made ridiculous by seeming to stand in fear of "relatively innocent forms of Communist propaganda." At the same time, the incident provides the Communists with material to support their campaign that the government represents nothing more than a pseudo-fascist clique whose real aim is the abolition of democratic freedoms.

Comment: This is the first reported instance of a petty measure in the government's anti-Communist campaign which began in January 1951 when the international headquarters of Communist organizations in Paris were outlawed.

3. FRENCH MOROCCO. Consequences of deferment of Moroccan debate in UN General Assembly: North African nationalists probably will make strong verbal protests against the UN General Committee's postponement of debate on Arab charges that France is violating human rights in Morocco. The Communist press also will exploit US support for French "repressive" measures as another example of US "imperialism" in Africa. Demonstrations and disorders are probable, but sufficient French troops are in the area to control the situation.

This postponement is a major political and diplomatic victory for France as well as for Western solidarity. French-US relations throughout North Africa, but most particularly in Morocco, can now be expected to improve. The US, however, will lose favor with the Moroccan Sultan and the nationalists, although neither will turn to the USSR for assistance.

The Arab states have indicated their intention to bring up the matter again when the Committee presents its proposed agenda for the ap-

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proval of the General Assembly as a whole. Most Moroccan	nationalistic
leaders, however, may be privately glad that the question	is postponed
because they have been apprehensive that the case was jeo	pardized by
hasty preparation of the brief.	

Sultan refuses to make statement desired by the French: 4. The Sultan of Morocco is reported to have refused a request by the French 25X1 Resident General that he proclaim solidarity with France. 25X1

Comment: The Sultan traditionally sends a message to his subjects on the national holiday, which currently is on 18 November, the anniversary of the Sultan's accession to the throne. It is extremely doubtful that the Sultan in his annual message will make any references to "Franco-Moroccan solidarity."

AUSTRIA. British abandoning Vienna airstrip project: Complications arising over the proposed construction of an emergency airstrip in the British sector of Vienna point to abandonment of the project. Partly because of their long-standing "hands-off" policy in Austria, and partly because of a reluctance to incite further Communist publicity on the subject, the British are unwilling to requisition the site from the Austrians.

US officials in Vienna, feeling it unwise to give the impression that the West has succumbed to Communist propaganda, are surveying the possibility of an alternative airstrip in the US sector.

BELGIUM-NETHERLANDS. Belgian and Dutch presses are highly critical of sensationalism in US journalism: The Belgian press, highly critical of a part of the US press for its terrifying description of "the next war." charges that such graphic accounts furnish the Communists with "excellent propaganda fodder." The strongest attacks were directed against Collier's, which, by sensationalizing a theoretical third world war, is pictured as either bent on creating the mental climate for actual war or reflecting US public opinion that war is inevitable.

The unfavorable comment by the Dutch press on the Collier's issue is similar to that of the Belgian press. The Dutch also term the publicity for the next world war "shocking and shamelessly sensational." A Dutch Foreign Office official has stated that these articles serve only too well the Soviet's propaganda aims.

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Comment: This harsh criticism from Belgium and the Netherlands corroborates that from France and may be indicative of a recurrent general Western European fear concerning the direction and stability of US policy in the East-West struggle. It is particularly harmful at a time when Western defense plans, designed to keep the peace, are placing a heavy financial burden on the peoples of Western Europe.

γ	. NETHERLANDS. Dutch legation in Bucharest to be closed: For reasons of
	economy, the Netherlands will soon close its legation in Bucharest, Rumania.
25X1	Dutch interests in Rumania, especially those of a consular nature, will be
	looked after by the Belgian Legation in Bucharest.
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	Comment: At the conference of Dutch ministers in Eastern Europe held
	at The Hague last April, it was decided to reduce gradually Dutch represen-
	tation in the Orbit countries in order to curtail government expenses.

25X18.

9. UNITED KINDGOM. Measures proposed so far not adequate for British economic

9. UNITED KINDGOM. Measures proposed so far not adequate for British economic crisis: The US Embassy in London considers that R. A. Butler's first speech as Chancellor of the Exchequer on 7 November made a good impression and will probably have a psychologically beneficial effect, but that the economic measures the new government has proposed will not be sufficient to restore confidence in sterling. The extent of this loss of confidence in sterling was emphasized by the Chancellor's announcement that in October alone the dollar deficit amounted to 320 million dollars and by his estimate, based on present trends, of a possible over—all 1952 deficit of 500 to 600 million.

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The Embassy doubts that the program proposed, which includes a heavy cut in imports, reduced internal consumption, and a general tightening up of government expenditure, will be adequate even if the other members of the Commonwealth cooperate in cutting their dollar expenditures. The Embassy believes, moreover, that this cooperation will be more difficult to obtain than it was in the 1949 financial crisis, since the UK is now less able to provide the other Commonwealth members with an alternative source of capital goods.

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Comment: In the last connection it is probably significant that the Commonwealth Finance Ministers conference, originally scheduled for late November, has now been postponed until January. Other government measures for dealing with the economic crisis will depend to a great extent on external factors, particularly the prospects of financial aid from the US and the cooperation to be anticipated from other non-sterling countries.

10. UNITED KINGDOM. Government requests coal from US. Following a Cabinet decision on the subject, the UK on 8 November requested through OEEC the importation of 750,000 tons of US coal this winter. The British would like deliveries to begin in December, and hope that the US can provide a substantial part of the necessary shipping.

Comment: Last August the Labor government, because of the dollar shortage, refused the National Coal Board's request for authorization to buy 1.5 million tons of coal from the US. Just before the 25 October general election the UK Government considered asking the US for 1.3 million tons to enable it to increase British coal exports, mainly to Sweden, in return for much needed iron ore. Now, however, it appears that despite the dollar shortage the government has decided it must import coal simply for domestic consumption in an effort to avoid a coal crisis this winter. This pessimistic view of the coal situation is further illustrated by the 8 November cut in coal allocations to householders to less than 50 percent of last winter's allocations.

11. NORWAY. Government replies to Soviet protest on war graves. In a note to the USSR on 8 November the Norwegian Government "notes and deplores" the unusually strong wording with which the Soviet Government on 31 October protested the movement of Russian war graves. The Norwegian reply refers the Soviet Government to Norway's earlier detailed statements on the subject and repeats the suggestion for a joint commission to plan new cemeteries. Pointing out that the movement of graves from North Norway is virtually complete, the Norwegian Government states finally that further plans for concentration will be held in abeyance.

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Comment: This note follows the usual pattern of a firm rejection of Soviet accusations, but appears slightly more terse than the Norwegian replies to other Soviet notes this fall. The suspension of further concentration is a conciliatory gesture, but does not indicate that Norway has been intimidated since, in order to frustrate Soviet espionage efforts, those graves in the north had priority. Norway would like to preclude any additional propaganda advantage to the Soviet Union and the local Communists on this issue, which it regards as little more than a tempest—in—a—teapot fomented for just that purpose.

12.	SWEDEN. Poland to receive strategic ball bearings: The chief Swedish
	trade negotiator with Poland has informed the Swedish Cabinet and US Em-
	bassy officials that the Poles are unwilling to conclude a trade agree-
25X1	ment unless Sweden provides some List I
	bearings. He expects to be advised by the Cabinet to prevail upon SKF
	(the Swedish manufacturer of ball bearings) to revise its firm stand to-
	wards the Poles and offer one million crowns (\$193,000) worth of List I
	bearings. Although he does not expect Polish agreement on that basis, he
	hopes to keep the ultimate concession not substantially greater. The
25X1	Swedes have already indicated that 200,000 tons of iron ore in addition
05)/4	to the previous year's 700,000 may be forthcoming.
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Comment: The Department of State has concluded that Sweden must obtain 2.5 to 3 million tons of coal from Poland and recognizes that some embargo-type bearings must be exported in compensation. It has expressed its hope that such bearings can be limited in value to 1.5 million crowns (\$289,000).

13. COLOMBIA. Battalion in Korea praised by General van Fleet: General van Fleet reports that during the past three months, while the Colombians were attached to the 21st Infantry Regiment of the US 24th Division, they participated in all advances and shared largely in inflicting heavy losses on Chinese Communist forces. As of 25 October, the Colombians had 12 killed, 59 wounded, and 9 missing in action out of a total of 1,050 men. This is a remarkably low casualty rate for a unit in front line action and close support, and attests to excellent combat efficiency, according to General van Fleet. He attributes the meritorious conduct of the Colombian Battalion largely to the leadership of its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Polania Puvo. which was reflected in the battalion's enthusiasm.

Comment: Lengthy personal accounts published in the Bogota newspaper El Tiempo show that the Colombian soldiers themselves are somewhat surprised that they were able to meet the standard expected of them in Korea.

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13 November 1951

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TO THE DAILY DIGEST

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

1. AUSTRALIA. Government will approve Middle East Command but is unwilling to sponsor joint declaration: Australia will not sponsor the joint declaration on the Middle East Command. It feels that the text, by indirection, would probably have the effect of committing Australian troops to the Middle East in wartime, which is a step further than Australia has yet agreed to go. The government feels it should not have been asked to abandon its reservations and publicly announced position against troop commitment on such short notice. Australia is willing, however, to announce general approval of the Middle East Command after the declaration.

2. JAPAN/CHINA. Japan's attitude toward China disclosed: The Japanese Government believes that negotiations for a peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government should be delayed until after the multilateral treaty comes into force, according to the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. He pointed out that Prime Minister Yoshida desired to "do everything possible not to antagonize the UK and Commonwealth Governments prior to their ratification of the peace treaty," but left the impression that the Japanese would be receptive to an early Chinese Nationalist approach for exploratory negotiations.

The Vice Minister also strongly reaffirmed that the Japanese Government has no intention of concluding a bilateral peace treaty or establishing relations of any kind with Communist China.

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<u>Comment</u>: This is the first time that Japan's policy regarding a peace treaty with Nationalist China has been clarified. Prime Minister Yoshida's careful circumlocution of this question in the Diet led to some speculation that Japan would seek to work out a modus vivendi with both Chinese regimes.

Under considerable pressure from industrial interests not to prejudice future trading prospects with the Communists, but at the same time cognizant of the need for Japan to parallel US policy on China, the Japanese Government probably will be receptive to the conclusion of a treaty with the Nationalists which would extend only to the territory and people now under Nationalist control.

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)

3. GERMANY. Western promise of ultimate NATO membership may satisfy Germany:
US High Commissioner McCloy in Germany declares it is clear that while Chancellor Adenauer is not demanding German membership in NATO now, he nevertheless will not accept any arrangement which ultimately will discriminate against

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Germany.	McCloy believes that Adenauer would accept an arrangement whereby
11 - 77	an Allica yould give their assurances that at some "Appropriate
the wester	too far distant they would see that Germany had the same relation-
time" not	too far distant they would see that dermany had
-1-4 +h	MATO as other participants in the European Delense Commanity.
Surb arou	would have to use such a promise in his dealings with German
Adenauer 1	would have to use such a promise in his doction
parliamen	tary leaders, it could not be kept secret.

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Comment: It has been apparent for some weeks that the problem of Germany's relationship to NATO was worrying Adenauer. Although the matter is not an urgent one at the moment, the Chancellor will certainly require satisfactory answers when the European army plan comes before the Bundestag, where the prevailing view is that Germany must receive equal treatment.

4. UNITED KINGDOM. British believe German NATO candidacy must be deferred:

A senior Foreign Office official, confirming the British Government's opinion that Germany should eventually be admitted to NATO, has indicated that his government now feels that German admission may have to be put off for some time. He emphasized that a "dramatic" German entrance now might cause "serious trouble" with the Russians, and quoted Foreign Secretary Eden as saying that it was inadvisable to consider German membership until after contractual relations are signed and a European Defense Force is set up.

The British Government apparently feels that pressure must now be brought to bear on the Germans rather than on the French.

<u>Comment:</u> This attitude is in line with Prime Minister Churchill's general faith in the feasibility of East-West negotiations and his desire to avoid any actions now which might disturb the atmosphere for top-level talks.

London reports that the Foreign Office has received no indications from the new Cabinet that any modification of British Far Eastern policy is in the offing. The Embassy points out, however, that Eden's relatively flexible attitude on the question of Chinese representation in the UN may indicate that there will be changes in emphasis in British policies.

Foreign Office officials have stated that the Peiping mission would be reduced in size and present consular offices in Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow, and Canton would be closed if the recent rapid decline in the number of British residents in China should continue over the near future. In Shanghai, for example, there are now only 1000 British residents, which represents a decline of 25 percent in the last three months.

Comment: If the British community in China declines to a hard core of a

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few hundred who would not leave under any circumstances, reduction of British representation in China would be justified on practical grounds, and would not necessarily reflect any change in the Foreign Office view of the desirability of establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime.

UK wants guarantee of European Defense Force's immediate aid 6. British North Atlantic Council Deputy Hoyer-Millar further explained his country's view that NATO relations with the European Defense Community (EDC) must insure immediate and effective use of European Defense Forces (EDF) under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in the event of aggression in Europe, since otherwise US and UK forces would be the only substantial ones immediately available. This could be achieved by a clear and unbroken chain of authority beginning with the EDF under SACEUR, SACEUR under strategic guidance from the Standing Group, and the latter under the political guidance of the North Atlantic Council. He said it would not be satisfactory if the chain of authority were complicated by the necessity for "other action by EDC," since the principle of unanimity would permit Germany or any other one nation to immobilize, at least temporarily, 25X1 all available NATO forces on the continent except those of the US and UK.

Comment: This view generally coincides with the European Defense Forces concept agreed on at the sixth North Atlantic Council meeting at Brussels last December. The reference to possible complications arising from the need for "other action by EDC" is not clear, as the interim report on EDF discussions provides for the commitment of EDF to NATO under the same conditions as the military contingents of other NATO members are committed.

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